This is War
When one writes the kind of commentaries that I do, it feels almost obligatory that I should write something about the current state of war in the Middle East, meaning Israel vs Hamas and perhaps other Palestinian groups. This is particularly true since I’ve previously written about my growing estrangement from Israel or, more particularly, the shift to the more extreme right of the Israeli government. But since war has come, my estrangement must be put aside because war in Israel is always an existential threat both to the state of Israel and the fate of every Jew living there.
That said, this must also be said: Israel — the Israeli government — is not totally innocent in this war. It is not simply a victim in Hamas’ surprise attack. Ever since the formation of this government in particular, it has allowed and even encouraged attacks on the part of West Bank settlers into Palestinian communities, not to mention the establishment of larger and more intrusive settlements on Palestinian territory. Perhaps the IDF even shifted military material and personnel to the West Bank from the Gaza border, thus making it more vulnerable to attack.
One (I) might suspect that there are some on the Israeli right who have been hoping for a confrontation, although I doubt if they thought that it would come from Hamas, at least not at the scale that the attack was launched. Obviously, no one expected this attack. And over the weekend, everyone (meaning Americans) was kind of obsessing about how both Israeli and Western intelligence agencies managed to miss any hint of the attack. There is no question of less importance now. What matters now, the only thing that matters now on the Israeli side, is how to prosecute this war to a successful conclusion, whatever that means.
But to continue where I was going before the previous paragraph: On the political side, the so-called Justice reform movement has bitterly divided Israel with continual demonstrations against the government by centrist and liberal Jews, refusal by some reservists, particularly in the Air Force, to continue their training, and, of course, the increasing estrangement of Jews living outside of Israel (except for ultra-orthodox communities).
And then there is Saudi Arabia and the increasing likelihood of their official recognition of the State of Israel. In the years following the creation of Israel as a state in 1948, the Arab countries surrounding Israel were generally united in their opposition to Israel but, even more, in their hatred of each other. As the saying used to go, “The only reason Israel survives is because Arabs hate each other even more than they hate Israel.” The thinking was, that if they could all put aside their mutual antagonism, Israel would have been extinguished a long time ago. But Israel was useful for them as well. They could attack Israel (at least verbally), which might help them not go to war with each other. This is not all that different than Europe in the Middle Ages, during which the Papacy urged Christian kings to embark on Crusades in the Middle East, at least in part to keep Christians from killing each other, not to mention increasing the temporal power of the Papacy. A common enemy can be a useful thing. And if there is one thing that is true of all cults (which, after all, is what all religions start off as being), it is that they need enemies. For Jews in long ago times, it was pagans. For Christians, it was Jews. For Muslims, it’s long been Jews as well, along with Christians. More recently, for the more orthodox of all three religions, it is secular society. It is striking to hear someone like the very Catholic Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito (in a speech in Rome in July 2022) describe American society in terms and language remarkably similar to those used by Osama bin Laden.
For Palestinians, who were barely seen as a distinct national group prior to the creation of Israel, the enemy obviously became Israel and its Jewish population with the encouragement of the surrounding Arab countries, who were themselves disinterested in absorbing Palestinian refugees into their countries. Not, by the way, that they should want to absorb the refugees, but it was politically useful for them to keep them in camps and fan resentment of Israel.
Things, however, are never static. Jordan and Egypt established relations with Israel. The Iraq War of George W. Bush changed the power dynamics of the Arab Middle East. Whereas before Iraq and Iran were at loggerheads, the defeat of Iraq immeasurably increased the power of Iran. But with the demise of Iraq, that left Saudi Arabia as Iran’s most powerful adversary. The adversarial relationship is not simply fueled by political power rivalry, but by religious rivalry as well. Shite vs Sunni. And then, in the past few years, the Abraham Accords further eroded the once-solid Arab opposition to Israel. The prospect of a defense security agreement between the Saudis and the US, along with Saudi recognition of Israel and some kind of improvement in Israel/Palestinian relations, means that the Hamas attacks over the past weekend, at the very least, put a temporary halt to those negotiations, something very much in Iran’s interests.
Perhaps these three things: the increasing harshness of the treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank, the stark divisions in Israeli society regarding the changes in the justice system, and the likelihood of a rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, affected the timing of Hamas’ attack, an attack that obviously took months to plan and prepare.
At the moment, I have no idea what role Iran played in planning, training, supplying, financing, or implementing these attacks, but it would surprise no one if they were deeply involved.
In some quarters, one can already hear the declarations of moral equivalency between the treatment of Palestinians by Israel and the attacks by Hamas. On Saturday night, I believe I heard a representative of Human Rights Watch describe the “root cause” of the attacks being the treatment of Palestinians by Israel. But in thinking about “root causes,” one must never forget that the goal of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and like-minded groups, is not the alleviation of Palestinian suffering and finding a path to peace with Israel. Rather, it is the destruction of the State of Israel. In its attacks, Hamas has demonstrated, and is continuing to demonstrate, what it means by the elimination of Israel. The indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israeli cities with the intent to kill Jews, and, even more, the deliberate savagery and bestiality of the personal attacks by Hamas militants on Israelis, is all one needs to know of the true aims of Hamas.
Here's a question for you. Is/was Hamas’ (and Iran’s?) hope that their attack would quickly escalate into a wider conflict that would involve Lebanon and other neighboring countries, particularly once Israel becomes fully engaged in a counterattack that promises to be brutal? That’s not so far-fetched. The movement of a US carrier task force into the region is surely partly to deter such an eventuality. You can be fairly sure that one way or another, the US is warning other countries to stay out of the war. But no one can say if, over time, that will deter Hezbollah from entering the conflict.
That’s not the only question. For example, what does Hamas expect to gain from this war? Do they expect that the US and other countries will, at some point, prevent the Israelis from unleashing their full wrath on Hamas and Gaza by insisting on a cease-fire? Might that result in leaving Hamas in a stronger position in relation to Israel than it was before the war? Or, to put it another way, is Hamas expecting the international community to win its war for them?
And how about this one: Hamas knows that Israel’s retaliation will be furious and that many otherwise innocent inhabitants of Gaza will be killed as a result. Is part of Hamas’ calculation that they will gain adherents to their cause and that the deaths of their fellow Palestinians are, therefore, a worthwhile sacrifice?
What about the Israelis? What are their goals in this war? Freeing of hostages, to be sure. Vengeance, too. Early statements called for the elimination of Hamas as a material threat to Israel. No one knows what that really means (meaning, maybe, that I don’t). If Israel launches a massive land attack on Gaza, can hostages be rescued? My guess is that they are not all located in one place but are scattered throughout the territory. So, some, probably. Others, not. Can catastrophic deaths to the civilian population of Gaza be avoided? Probably not. Or maybe more to the point, will any of the ground forces in the IDF really care about civilian deaths? Will the desire for vengeance override the interest in avoiding civilian deaths?
These and many other questions have yet to be answered. But this is war. It has barely begun, and the questions or answers one has today are likely to be overturned by events tomorrow. Like all wars, plans and goals change as the parties involved deal with reality. And even then, things are likely to be increasingly unclear as the fog of war roils the region.